The Battle of Verdun

The Poilus (French infantry soldiers) resisted despite the shells that rained down, but they lost Fort Douaumont just a few days into the battle, on 25 February 1916. From then on, the French general staff sought to take back the fort, which stood in a commanding position above the battlefield. General Pétain was put in charge of the troops tasked with defending Verdun. A system of traffic control had been set up on the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. Pétain used this road, which later became known as the “Sacred Way”, to transport large numbers of men, together with huge volumes of provisions and equipment, to the front. Bolstered by the new troops, the French were able to repel the German attack.

The Somme offensive was launched on 1 July. Intended to ease pressure on Verdun, it became a deadlocked battle of attrition, failing to break through the German front. After ten months of fighting, the Battle of Verdun ended on 18 December 1916. There were 700,000 victims: 306,000 dead or missing and around 400,000 injured. The losses suffered by the two sides were almost identical.

The battle was fought between France and Germany and also involved colonial forces. For France, it was not just an important battle, but indeed the battle – three-quarters of the French army fought at Verdun. Consequently, in the French national conscience it is seen as the symbol of the Great War, of which it marked both the apex and a turning point.

There was fighting around Verdun from the start to the end of the war. The battle in 1916 marked a pivotal moment in all these combats, which spanned the period from 1914 to 1918. But it also played a decisive role in the final victory, in that the Germans were forced to adapt their overall strategy in the light of their failure at Verdun and the considerable losses they suffered in the Somme and on the Hauts de Meuse plateau. As this put them temporarily on the defensive, they launched an all-out campaign of submarine warfare which brought the USA into the war, tipping the balance of power in favour of the Allies.

In addition, the Battle of Verdun entered the French national conscience from the initial days, becoming the “Battle of France”. It alone sums up the Great War, making Verdun its eminently symbolic place of remembrance.

This fortified town, with forts overlooking the deep ravines of the Hauts de Meuse and the Woëvre Plain, may appear an illogical place to attack. There were several reasons for the decision. Firstly, Verdun and its forts had the potential to be used as a departure point for a French attack towards the Woëvre which would have threatened the lines of communication connecting Germany to the entire western front. Secondly, the Germans knew that the area had been in a stranglehold since late September 1914. Supplies could only be brought in via the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun or on the small metre-gauge railway which was insufficient to cater for a large-scale battle. Lastly, they probably had knowledge of the decision by General Joffre, the commander in chief of the French army, to disarm the Verdun forts in August 1915. The large guns and munitions had been transferred to other places on the front. Only a few pieces of artillery in gun turrets remained. The forts were like empty shells sitting on the hilltops. As a result of this order, the entrenched camp became known as the RFV, for Region Fortifiée de Verdun, or Verdun fortified region.

With a war to fight on two fronts, in the west and in the east, leaving him short of reserves, von Falkenhayn planned an artillery-heavy offensive. To achieve this, he decided to assemble a very large number of guns, surpassing anything that had been seen in the past. His aim was to literally crush the French trenches before sending the infantry in to attack.

Some researchers accept that von Falkenhayn’s aim was indeed to use the powerful artillery supplied to the 5th German Army to impose as many losses as possible on the French forces. Others believe that the aim was to inflict a highly symbolic defeat on the French army which would force it to evacuate Verdun town, leaving behind it the forts on the right bank of the Meuse. This defeat, they said, would have made it possible to begin negotiating a peace settlement. Other researchers believe that through the offensive against Verdun, the Germans aimed to retake control of the western front. Faced with such an attack on Verdun, the French would have had no choice but to pull troops away from other areas of the front to serve as reinforcements, forcing the British to attack in Artois. With both the French and British weakened, the Germans would have been in a position to strike as the opportunity arose in one or more locations on the western front. Did von Falkenhayn give the order to take Verdun town? Again, we cannot say for sure, but that definitely was the objective pursued by his subordinates in charge of organising the offensive, Crown Prince Wilhelm and his chief of staff, General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf.

In January, three further army corps arrived from the north of France: the 3rd, 18th and 15th Army Corps. In all, ten divisions of infantry totalling some 150,000 men were assembled. The woods to the north and north-east of Verdun were filled with depots. Many new artillery batteries were created, equipped with 10, 13, 15 and 21cm artillery pieces as well as 30.5 and 42cm heavy mortars. The latter were capable of firing projectiles weighing almost a tonne over 14km. The Germans had 14 railway lines on the Verdun front, so they were able to concentrate their troops and equipment rapidly. In total, including the mortars in the trenches, almost 1,200 artillery pieces had their sights set on the enemy and Verdun town.

In autumn 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel Driant, the commander of the 56th and 59th Battalions of Light Infantrymen in one area of the Verdun fortified region informed the French general staff, led by the generalissimo, General Joffre, that Verdun’s defences were insufficient. Joffre, who did not wish to entertain the idea of a German threat on this part of the front, was not worried. He believed that the Germans could not justify an attack against a stronghold in steep terrain on an outlying part of the front.
In addition, he was completely absorbed by the new offensive that he was planning jointly with Britain in the Somme for the following summer.

In January 1916 however, reports of enemy activity became alarming. As a result, Joffre decided to leave in place the troops he had intended to take from General Herr, commander of the Verdun fortified region. He authorised General Castelnau, chief of staff, to carry out an inspection to establish the state of French defences at Verdun. Castelnau ordered work to be carried out urgently. General Herr built up the defences on the left bank of the Meuse, in case the right bank had to be abandoned. The 5th German Army planned to launch their attack on 12 February. However, poor weather conditions forced them to delay. This gave the French a few extra days to reinforce their defences on both sides of the river. But they had left it very late! The night before the attack, the French had almost 25,000 infantry soldiers from the 72nd, 51st and 14th Infantry Divisions on the fronts on the right bank of the Meuse, supported by 140 pieces of artillery, in unfinished defensive positions. Behind the lines, another two and a half divisions stood ready to intervene at short notice. Further south, the 20th Army Corps was starting to arrive at Bar-le-Duc.

At 7.15am on 21 February 1916, the Germans sent a barrage of fire that they called Trommelfeuer raining down on the French trenches from the village of Malancourt to the Woëvre Plain and Verdun town. On the right bank, back over 5km the French positions were literally upended. The Haumont, Caures, Ville and Herbebois Woods were devastated. The trees were uprooted, tossed into the air as the biggest shells fell. The trenches and communications trenches were pulverised. Heavy shells also fell on the forts. The men lay in their shelters, hoping that they wouldn’t collapse. In the early afternoon, the bombardment intensified. It was a living hell. At 4pm, the shelling ceased at last. Around 350,000 shells had been fired during the day. The noise and the pounding on the ground were so powerful that General Passaga reported having heard the bombardment from his headquarters in the Vosges, 160km away!

The German assault troops of the 7th Reserve Corps, the 18th Corps and the 3rd Corps launched their attack through the devastated forests. They managed to take Haumont Woods, but elsewhere they were amazed to discover that not all of the French troops had been killed or wounded by their “storms of steel”. While some surrendered, others put up a tough fight against the Germans despite being seriously outnumbered. The light infantrymen of the 56th and 59th Battalions defended their positions ferociously. Further east, the men of the 164th and 243rd Infantry Regiments doggedly protected their upended trenches with an energy born of despair.

At the end of the day, Caures and Herbebois Woods were still in the hands of the French. The following morning, the Germans resumed their shelling for another three hours, then attacked again. The French defences were overrun. Lieutenant-Colonel Driant was killed by a shot through the head during the evacuation of Caures Woods. Only about a hundred of the 1,200 light infantry under his command were not either killed or taken prisoner. The French Front had been breached. Haumont village fell the same day. The next day, another French division was added to reinforce the French troops but not given any information on the positions held by the enemy or their numbers. It too dissolved into the pandemonium of the battle. On 24 February, Samogneux, Beaumont and Ornes were taken by the men of the 5th Army. The first and second French defensive positions had fallen in their entirety.

On 25 February, the 24th German Infantry Regiment, caught under its own barrage of artillery fire, risked all as it launched an attack on Fort Douaumont, the key fortification in Verdun’s north-eastern defences. Believing the enemy to be much further away, the little garrison of 50 men did not defend the fort and it fell like a ripe fruit into the hands of the Germans. “Douaumont ist gefallen!” (Douaumont has been captured).

The high position on which the fort had been built offered excellent views over all the surrounding countryside. In addition, its concrete shell could shelter large numbers of men. The French general staff rapidly became obsessed with retaking the fort. But in the short term, their priority was to stop the Germans. During the six-day battle, the French had lost 21,000 men, half of all those engaged. In places, the Germans had advanced more than 8km!

The next day, General Pétain was appointed head of the 2nd Army, responsible for defending Verdun. Despite the difficult situation, his orders were to continue the defence of the town on the right bank. To do this, he put in place a “noria” system of revolving reinforcements to bring to the front in turn all the reserve divisions he had and any others that General Joffre would give him. These units travelled to the front line via the battlefield's main artery: the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, which rapidly became known as the Sacred Way. On the same day, the French succeeded in holding out against the Germans when they fought off three consecutive attacks on Douaumont village. Overall, the French defences recovered and tightened. Verdun did not fall.

Over the following days, the battle became less intense because the Germans had used up an enormous number of projectiles. They needed not only to top up their stocks but also to move artillery pieces forward to keep up with the advances they had made. At the end of the month, von Falkenhayn was surprised that the French and British had not reacted on the other areas of the front. His predictions had turned out to be wrong. Despite the colossal attack on Verdun, Joffre maintained his strategy of keeping back as many reserve troops as possible and the most recent artillery equipment for the offensive on the Somme. This behaviour encouraged Falkenhayn, motivated by the initial successes of the attack, to restart his advances against the town, capitalising on his army’s superior artillery.

When the offensive restarted, it targeted both banks of the Meuse. The Germans aimed to break the deadlock on the right bank by increasing the pressure, but also to take the high ground above the left bank to silence the French artillery that was hitting German troop movements side-on from the opposite bank.

On 6 March, after formidable preparatory fire from their artillery, the Germans attacked on the left bank of the Meuse, advancing on the high ground at Le Mort-Homme. Attacks and counter-attacks alternated in Corbeaux Woods and at the foot of the ridge line. Over the same days, on the right bank, the Germans attempted to push south from Fort Douaumont through La Caillette Ravine to take Fort Vaux and Vaux village. There was fierce fighting under a deluge of shells and the Germans made little progress. For example, on 8 March, the soldiers of the German 19th Reserve Infantry Regiment attacked Vaux village thirteen times in a row before they succeeded in taking part of the ruins. On 20 March, a Bavarian division captured the French positions in Avocourt and Malancourt Woods and approached Hill 304. On 9 April, the Germans took Le Mort-Homme, but despite intense shelling and fierce assaults, they could advance no further. For the first time, General Pétain allowed himself to show some optimism in the orders he sent to the army the following day, when he said, “Stand firm, we’ll get them!”.

At the beginning of May, Pétain was promoted to command the Group of Armies in Central France. It is important to note that this promotion was actually a move by Joffre to sideline him as he was demanding too many resources to defend Verdun. He was replaced by General Nivelle. On 3 May, 500 heavy German guns pummelled Hill 304. The clouds of smoke rose to an altitude of more than 800 metres! The hill was eventually taken over the following days (between 4 and 7 May). On the right bank, attacks and counter-attacks alternated within the triangle between Douaumont, Thiaumont and Fort Vaux. On 8 May, there was a catastrophe at Fort Douaumont. A shell depot exploded. In the passageways packed with men, the situation was horrific. In all, 679 German soldiers died – burned, suffocated or trampled. On 22 May 1916, the French made their first attempt to retake Fort Douaumont on the right bank. The assailants reached a part of the roof of the fort, but were isolated from the rest of the group, held back by the deluge of artillery fire, and surrendered after fighting for two days. On 1 June, 40,000 Germans equipped with ten large flamethrowers launched an attack from the slopes of La Caillette to the slopes of Fort Vaux. The men of the 50th Division reached the fort. It was the start of a siege that was to last six days. The garrison, under the orders of commander Raynal, ferociously defended every metre of passageway against the Germans who had encircled the fort and taken the roof. The defenders finally surrendered on the morning of 7 June, exhausted by the fighting and overcome with thirst. After the fort fell, the Germans had good bases from which to capture Verdun town at last. All they had to do was take the ridge which ran from the Froideterre fortification through Fleury-devant-Douaumont to Souville Fort.

The logistical effort required to transport supplies to the battle was immense. On the French side, there was a constant line of traffic along the Sacred Way to ensure that the divisions were relieved regularly and to bring supplies and ammunition. In total, 3,500 trucks, 2,000 cars and 800 ambulances came and went between Bar-le-Duc in one direction and Nixéville, Regret or Blercourt in the other. A truck passed every 14 seconds. At the height of the struggle, in June and July, it was one every five seconds. Each week, 90,000 men and 50,000 tonnes of equipment were transported. The road was badly worn by the solid rubber tyres of the vehicles, and 1,200 territorial army men worked doggedly on the edge of it, pouring 700,00 thousand tonnes of stone onto the carriageway to fill in the potholes and ruts that formed.

On 20 June 1916, the Germans commenced preparatory fire for an attack that would definitively break through the French front. Some 2,000 German guns pounded the French positions. Almost 100,000 gas shells were fired. The elite troops of the Alpenkorps took part in the assault. On 23 June, 50,000 men were engaged in the battle: they took the Thiaumont fortification and almost all of the village of Fleury-devant-Douaumont, but they were stopped at the Froideterre fortification. The French front came within a hair’s breadth of being breached. The next day, the Allies began preparatory artillery fire in the Somme. On 1 July, the British and the French began their offensive on that part of the front. If they wanted to take Verdun, the 5th Army would have to relaunch their attack. On 11 and 12 July 1916, the German army made their last attempt to take the town. They fired 330,000 shells, and then sent 40,000 men into battle. The remains of battalions extended their hold to encompass all of Fleury, and succeeded in reaching Fort Souville. There, the handful of soldiers who had survived the deluge of steel resulting from the 170,000 shells fired by the French, suffered a counter-attack and were pushed off of the roof of the fort. Afterwards, the Germans went on the defensive, only launching local attacks. Already severely tested by the battle, the German army was also contending with the French and British offensive in the Somme. But even so, the fighting was not over. From mid-June until mid-August, a violent battle raged for control of the village of Fleury. The French took it once and for all on 18 August. After a final German attack at Vaux-Chapitre Woods on 3 September, the French definitively gained the upper hand.

In September and October, the French committed considerable resources to staging a counter-attack and recapturing Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux. They brought together 650 artillery pieces to prepare and support the attack. On 21 October, preparatory fire began. Among the cannons they had assembled, the French had unlimbered two heavy howitzers on a 400mm-gauge railway. On 23 October, one of these artillery pieces inflicted serious damage on Fort Douaumont and its garrison. On 24 October, the regiments from four French divisions began their advance behind a creeping barrage. Fort Douaumont was recaptured relatively easily. However, the attack on Fort Vaux failed. Overall, the operation was a great success: 6,000 prisoners were taken, along with 15 large-calibre guns, 51 minenwerfer and 144 machine guns. On 2 November, the French intercepted a radio message from which they learned that Fort Vaux had been evacuated. The following night, they entered the building. The fort had been recaptured. The last offensive of the Battle of Verdun took place on 15 December. The French unlimbered 886 guns. In temperatures of -20°C, French soldiers from four divisions cleared the area around Fort Douaumont and recaptured Louvemont and Bezonvaux. The offensive came to an end on 18 December when Chambrettes Farm was captured. 11,387 Germans were taken prisoner, and 115 large-calibre guns, 44 minenwerfer and 107 machine guns were captured. The Battle of Verdun was over. Other operations undertaken in late summer 1917 improved the French lines on this part of the front.